Human Rights Violations in Syria - October 2024

As of October 25, the UNHCR estimated that roughly  440,000  people had entered Syria since the beginning of increased Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon, with approximately 70% being Syrian and the remainder Lebanese. Initially, SJAC documenters noted that due to the sheer number of people crossing the border, security forces manning checkpoints at border crossings were conducting much fewer ID and security checks than normal. However, in October, documenters, media, and civil society began reporting additional  arrests  of Syrians who recently entered Syria from Lebanon. In October, SJAC documented the death of a Syrian man in a government detention facility, after he was arrested in Idlib’s Khan Sheikhun after entering Syria from Lebanon. According to SJAC documenters, the government’s military intelligence reportedly detained another man, Shadi Mohammad Al-Shartah, at the Al-Dabousiyeh border crossing (Homs governorate) in October, taking him to an unknown location. SJAC is closely monitoring these detentions and conditions for those displaced from Lebanon. Documenters note that those currently staying in government-controlled areas are typically reluctant to speak about their experiences, and it will likely take time for documenters to identify individuals living in these areas who are willing to be interviewed at length.

Along with being subject to myriad human rights violations, including arbitrary detention and torture, Syrians entering government-held areas of Syria reportedly have no access to assistance or services and face dismal economic conditions. Media noted that the Syrian government has provided grossly insufficient  services  to recent waves of Syrians displaced from Lebanon, with media depicting people  sleeping  in the streets near a major  garage  in Damascus, a popular destination for buses of Syrians heading toward Damascus from the Lebanese border. Documenters have also heard several reports of recently displaced Syrians being taken advantage of, with drivers and landlords sharply increasing prices due to people’s desperate situations either in Damascus itself or during their further travel towards northern Syria.

In parallel with its attacks that prompted mass displacement from Lebanon, Israel also targeted numerous areas of Syria throughout October. SJAC documenters and media outlets reported that some of these attacks resulted in civilian casualties. The government’s Ministry of Defense  claimed  that Israeli airstrikes on several locations in Damascus on October 2 killed 3 civilians and injured several others. On October 8, Israeli airstrikes on the Al-Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus reportedly  killed  at least 7 people, including women and children. Media also reported that two doctors,  Rahaf Qamhieh  and her husband  Shawki Al-Hussain , were among those killed in the October 8 attacks. In mid-October, Israeli airstrikes on a weapons and ammunition  warehouse  used by government forces and Iranian-affiliated militias in Latakia governorate caused a massive explosion, which state media claimed injured two civilians. An Israeli drone targeting a Hezbollah leader in the Al-Mezzeh neighborhood reportedly also killed a  civilian  on October 22.

Israel also targeted multiple areas of  Homs , Rif Dimashq (including Syria’s main  border crossing  with Lebanon) in October, along with alleged military facilities in  Hama ,  Daraa , and  Al-Quneitra  governorates. Even if Israeli attacks aim to target military facilities in Syria, civilians remain at risk from these attacks. The Syrian government’s willingness to place military and weapons storage facilities, especially Iran-linked facilities, near civilian inhabited areas poses a serious threat to civilians throughout Syria, as they may become collateral damage in attacks targeting these facilities, such as what occurred in Damascus this month, and in Hama’s  Masyaf  last month.

Even prior to Israeli attacks prompting displacement from Lebanon, SJAC has documented arbitrary arrests of refugees returning to Syria after being deported from Turkiye and Lebanon, as reports of forced returns began to increase in early 2024. Government security forces  arrested  Jamil Al-Nusayrat on October 13 at the Mankat Al-Hatab checkpoint in Daraa governorate following his recent return from Türkiye. His family and other civilians in Daraa threatened the government with further “escalation” if he was not released, and the government ended up  releasing  him 24 hours later. This type of negotiated/threatened release occasionally happens for people arrested who are originally from Daraa and Suwayda governorates, but is much less common for people from other governorates where groups of civilians have comparatively less leverage. For several reasons, in the first few days after the arrests, locals in both Suwayda and Daraa governorates are often able to pressure the government to release civilians who are from those areas. In Daraa, locals often threaten violent action against government forces stationed in the area to prompt the releases, but these encounters can quickly turn violent, posing further threat to civilians.

Government military and intelligence detaining civilians remains common in Damascus and Rif Dimashq. On October 3, government forces  arrested  a civilian man, Osama Muhsin Ghanem, when he visited the Al-Shoughour police department in Damascus to report stolen property, stating that he was wanted by the judiciary for failing to return components of his military uniform after completing reserve service several years prior. When Ghanem’s family visited the police department to ask about him, the police told them that he had been transferred between multiple different security branches in Damascus and Homs. Ghanem was reportedly  released  two weeks later, but countless others have faced more sinister fates.

Similar to dynamics observed in Daraa governorate in recent months, such arrests of civilians in Damascus and Rif Dimashq can spark backlash from locals.

In the town of Zakia, government forces reportedly arrested two young men in October, which prompted local armed groups to attack locations of the government’s 4th Division in Zakia, resulting in  clashes . After news circulated about the possible death of Hassan Ghadeer, a leader in the government’s 4th Division, during the clashes, government forces reportedly imposed a  siege  on Zakia, requiring payment of steep fees to allow food and other essentials to enter the town. By the end of October, the 4th Division and government’s military security were engaged in discussions with local notables to end the siege, but the two sides had not reached an agreement. 

Locals in Zakia have  clashed  with government forces at multiple points earlier in 2024, often in protest of government military forces’ presence and involvement in illegal activities (including drugs) in the town. Following such clashes, government actors frequently offer a truce in exchange for residents turning over  weapons  to the government and those wanted for military service joining the government forces. However, locals typically refuse the terms, as many civilians in the area rely on their personal weapons as a defense against government violations and refuse to join the military.

In the south, which includes Daraa, Suwayda, and Al-Quneitra governorates, government-affiliated military and security groups have been responsible for security since regaining control of the area in 2018. In Daraa, civilians suffer from general insecurity throughout the governorate – assassinations and other violent attacks against civilian and military personnel represent a major threat, with SJAC documenters noting a significant increase in these attacks beginning in late 2023, a pattern that has continued to persist in 2024.

In October, SJAC documenters and local media outlets highlighted multiple assassinations of civilians, which the media attributes to “unknown persons.” Many of those targeted had  no military affiliation , with others being former  members  of the Free Syrian Army or those who previously  defected  from the government’s military. Documenters note that although some of the attacks targeting civilians may be the result of personal disputes (regarding debt, family arguments over inheritance or property, etc.), the prevalence of assassinations and violent attacks in Daraa poses a major threat to civilians throughout the governorate.  For example, in October, two  children  were injured due to being present near the site of a shooting in Jassem.

Civilians may also be killed or injured in a variety of other attacks or incidents, including IED explosions, unexploded ordnance, and by being caught in the crossfire during clashes between armed groups. In October, a 17-year old boy was  killed  when an IED exploded in Daraa city. Two other young men were killed when a mine  exploded  while they were working on a farm in eastern Daraa. Local media stated that such incidents are common – mines and unexploded ordnance are prevalent near government military facilities in Daraa, especially in locations that previously witnessed heavy fighting, and the government has made no effort to remove these mines since the area reconciled with the government in 2018.  

Clashes regularly occur between rival armed groups in Daraa, and civilians may be killed or wounded in these clashes. In October, fighting between two groups in Tafas  injured  multiple people. Local media also highlighted at least two  kidnappings  in Daraa in October, including a  child  kidnapped from her school. Perpetrators often seek high ransom from families of the kidnapped individuals. In several other incidents this month, unknown individuals used IEDs to target vehicles and patrols of government military and security personnel in Daraa. In one of these attacks, an IED, likely placed on the vehicle itself,  injured  6 government security personnel during a patrol. These IED attacks appear to target government forces, but these attacks also pose a danger to civilians in the area – they occur in civilian-inhabited areas, such as one IED  explosion  near a mosque in Daraa city’s Al-Qusour neighborhood in late October.

The untenable situation in Daraa, with civilians at risk of becoming collateral damage in clashes, or targeted victims of assassinations, continues to drive displacement. SJAC documenters note increasing numbers of Syrians from Daraa fleeing the country in an attempt to reach Europe.

In neighboring Suwayda governorate, the most recent wave of protests calling for reforms and regime change has been ongoing for more than a year. Protests continued throughout October on a consistent basis, with sparse protests during the week and bigger protest gatherings occurring on Fridays, as has been the case for several months.

Since late September, thousands of Syrians displaced from Lebanon have entered Autonomous Administration-controlled areas. As of November 3, the Autonomous Administration  estimated  the number of Syrians who had entered AANES-controlled areas at more than 20,000. For those without family or friends with whom to stay, these Syrians have been sheltering in camps, including the  Al-Adnaniyah camp  in Al-Raqqa governorate, which is reportedly housing at least 50 families. The Autonomous Administration claimed that it is providing essential goods (tents, blankets, etc.) to the families in this camp, but simultaneously called for support from the international community in addressing the needs of these displaced Syrians. According to SJAC documenters, the situation for Syrians displaced to AANES-controlled territory from Lebanon is very precarious, with many staying in camps without access to basic items. As more Syrians become willing to speak at length in the coming weeks, SJAC documenters will conduct interviews and further report on conditions for those entering AANES-controlled areas after fleeing Lebanon.

Turkish actions in Syria have complicated the process for many Syrians who had lived as refugees in Lebanon for several years. Those who are originally from areas in northeast Syria (Tall Abyad, Ras Al-Ain, etc.) that have now been occupied by Turkish-supported forces have  resorted  to staying in camps in Autonomous Administration-controlled areas of Al-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh governorates, given that they cannot return to their original homes.

In addition to the ongoing Turkish occupation of “Peace Spring” areas in Al-Hasakeh and Al-Raqqa governorates, late October witnessed an escalation of Turkish military activity across northern Syria, which had profound consequences for civilians. In a likely response to a Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-orchestrated  attack    that killed 5 people in the Turkish capital, Ankara, Türkiye conducted a barrage of attacks across northern Syria in the last week of October. These attacks resulted in civilian casualties and damage to critical infrastructure, including power stations and gas plants. One attack on an oil station near Tall Kojer  killed  7 employees of the facility. Turkish shelling near a crossing with the Turkish-controlled areas of Aleppo  injured  4 people in late October. Further shelling near  Tall Rifaat  and  Tall Sawsan  resulted in multiple civilian casualties, including women and children, and damage to homes. Even for attacks that do not result in casualties, such attacks have lasting impacts on civilians in the area, rendering basic services (electricity, fuel, running water) unavailable, with alternatives being prohibitively expensive and/or  dangerous .

In an October  interview  with a German news outlet, the Co-Chair of the AANES Foreign Relations Department, Ilham Ahmad, claimed that the area was ready to receive Syrian refugees deported from Europe, likely with the expectation of political recognition and financial support from the countries sending these refugees. The Autonomous Administration later  claimed  the statement had been taken out of context, and that the intent was that northeast Syria was willing to welcome voluntary returnees. In any case, given the precarious conditions in the area, including persistent arbitrary arrests and violations of detainees by the SDF, and ongoing Turkish attacks, it is evident that Autonomous Administration-controlled areas are not safe for return. This attempt to sway public opinion regarding conditions in one’s territory to make a political statement and/or receive international assistance is reprehensible, and bears an eerie resemblance to Syrian government tactics.

In October, an SDF-affiliated group called the Revolutionary Youth continued to conduct child recruitment in Aleppo governorate. SJAC documenters reported that the Revolutionary Youth kidnapped a young boy from SDF-controlled areas near Afrin. The Revolutionary Youth also kidnapped a minor girl from the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood of Aleppo city in late October. Documenters noted that this minor girl is Arab, rather than Kurdish, which is a somewhat rare occurrence. The girl’s family visited the Revolutionary Youth headquarters to ask about their daughter, but they denied any knowledge of her whereabouts, as they typically do. For further information about child recruitment by the Revolutionary Youth, SJAC detailed this pattern of violations more thoroughly in a public  report  earlier this year.

In October, the military police and members of various SNA factions continued to arrest civilians in Afrin and the surrounding area, a pattern that has occurred since Türkiye and the SNA factions gained control of the area in 2018. SJAC has witnessed an increase in these cases in the past several months. The military police  arrested  a civilian attempting to register his motorcycle in Jinderis in October. Other arrests occurred in  Afrin city  and  Azaz  as well, with the military police reportedly  releasing  some of the people detained after their relatives paid ransoms. In recent months, SJAC documenters have observed an upward trend in the amounts of money that the factions are requesting to release the people they arrest. It is now becoming more common to see amounts in the  thousands  (2,500 USD; 5,000 USD, etc.) when factions were typically requesting amounts in the hundreds previously.

In many of these  arrests , the military police accuse detainees of past “ cooperation with the Autonomous Administration ,” which refers to actions taken when the area was controlled by the AANES prior to 2018. This charge does not always indicate that a person was involved with Kurdish politics or military factions. The military police have arrested people who were previously employed by the AANES in any capacity, including strictly civilian jobs as teachers, nurses, or municipality employees. SJAC is currently exploring this pattern of violations in greater detail. 

Given that many Syrians recently displaced from Lebanon and deported from Türkiye have entered Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria, these Syrians are at risk of arrest as well. In October, SJAC documenters and local media highlighted multiple arrests of individuals who had recently entered the area from both Lebanon and Türkiye. On October 6, the military police  arrested  a man who had returned from Lebanon five days earlier, while he was attempting to procure documentation from a local council building in Afrin. This man was reportedly released after his family paid a ransom. On October 14, the military police  arrested  an Arab man near Afrin city who had returned from Lebanon the week prior, on the charge of working with the Asayish (Internal Security Forces, affiliated with the SDF) in the past. The military police also  arrested  a man from Afrin city in mid-October, about a week after he had been deported from Türkiye. To say that Turkish-controlled areas are unsafe for Syrians to return is an understatement – the military police, composed of members of various SNA factions, operates in these areas with minimal oversight, committing violations against civilian members of the population, often with complete impunity.

For Syrians displaced by Israeli shelling in Lebanon who entered Turkish-controlled areas in Syria, documenters reported lengthy security checks upon entry. Late in the month, the Interim Government’s Ministry of Defense issued a decision to open the  Abu Al-Zindayn  border crossing, allegedly to allow those fleeing bombardment in Lebanon to cross between Turkish-controlled areas and Syrian government-held areas. Whether or not to open the Abu Al-Zindayn crossing has been a significant point of contention between the Interim Government, SNA factions, and civilians in recent months. Many of the factions and civilians held sit-ins and shelled the crossing to prevent its opening, as it would serve as an indicator of normalizing relations with the Syrian government and prevent the factions from continuing to benefit financially from the smuggling of goods between the two territories using unofficial crossings. Given these continued protests, the Abu Al-Zindayn crossing reportedly  closed  again after only operating for two days in late October.

SJAC documenters have received reports that conditions along the roads to northern Syria are fraught with exploitation and requirements to pay bribes. However, they report that Syrians in this area typically have shelter. Similar to those entering HTS-controlled areas, people entering northern Syria after being displaced from Lebanon typically head for places where their relatives and friends are located, in order to stay with them.  

More generally, civilians in Turkish-controlled areas remain impacted by the ongoing conflict between the SDF and the SNA, and between the SNA and the government. Shelling from areas jointly controlled by the government and the SDF reportedly injured 6 people near Jarablus, including four children and a teacher. Shifting alliances and in-fighting between various National Army factions in recent months have also impacted civilians. A series of clashes between the Suqour Al-Shamal faction and the Joint Forces (a combination of the Al-Amshat and Al-Hamzat factions)  displaced  multiple families in villages near Hawar Killis in October, and reportedly injured civilians as well. SJAC documenters have also received reports that families living near the front lines with government-held areas temporarily left their homes in September and October, in anticipation of an upcoming major military operation.

SNA factions also engage in various housing, land, and property-related violations in the areas they control. Due to the current olive harvest season, many of these violations pertain to factions stealing olives from the harvest, or imposing fees (per tree) on landowning residents. In October, the Joint Forces (Al-Amshat and Al-Hamzat) cut down 35  olive trees  on private property near Afrin city, after they had stolen the olives from the trees. The perpetrators reportedly cut down the trees to use/sell as firewood, which is a common practice for the factions. Members of another faction  promised  to sell the fruit of 200 olive trees on civilian property near Maabatli to a buyer, despite the land’s civilian owner being present in the area. SJAC documenters note that proceeds from these harvests can be quite large, and this loss of income due to theft by the SNA factions inflicts significant financial harm on civilian residents in the area. Civilians have little recourse if they submit complaints about property violations committed by the factions – doing so may even put them at risk of  arrest .

People displaced by Israeli bombing in Lebanon, both Syrian and Lebanese, entered HTS-controlled territory in October. According to documenters, Syrians entering HTS-controlled territory after leaving Lebanon are primarily staying with relatives or friends in the area. The same security procedures apply to these Syrians as any Syrian who has entered HTS-controlled territory from government-held areas in recent years. All people entering the area are reportedly required to spend a small stint in a temporary detention facility, but these individuals are able to leave when someone from the area comes to “vouch” for them (ie, ensure they are not some sort of government spy/plant).

Civilians in HTS-controlled Syria experience ongoing airstrikes, artillery fire, and drone attacks launched by the Syrian government and allies. Despite an official ceasefire truce signed in 2020, since late 2023, Syrian government forces and their allies, including Iranian-affiliated militias and Russian aircraft, continue to attack civilian targets in HTS-controlled areas and areas immediately surrounding it, including southern Idlib, along with parts of Hama and western Aleppo governorates. These attacks result in civilian casualties and material damage to homes, farms, vehicles, schools, and other infrastructure. In October, documenters reported that they observed a larger amount of attacks launched by government and Russian forces than in the previous few months.

Government shelling on Al-Qasr village in western Aleppo reportedly killed a 60-year old man in early October. During a three-day period in mid-October, documenters reported more than 50 Russian airstrikes targeting various locations throughout Idlib governorate, which hit civilian property, industrial facilities, and power stations. These attacks reportedly killed at least 10 civilians (including women and children) and injured many others. Other shelling from government-controlled areas targeted Al-Atareb in western Aleppo, killing one civilian and injuring two others. Later in the month, government shelling on Sarmin injured two civilians, including a child. Another woman was reportedly killed due to government shelling of Arhab village (western Aleppo) late in the month.

In addition to traditional artillery and airstrikes, the Syrian government’s use of drones against civilian targets in HTS-controlled areas continued in October. Syrian government forces are increasingly using primitive, locally-built first-person view (FPV) suicide drones to attack their targets, causing civilian casualties and significant material damage. A teenager was injured when a government-launched drone hit him while he was working on his family’s farm near the town of Al-Bara (southern Idlib). A series of drones targeted Kafr Nouran village (western Aleppo), damaging three vehicles and equipment used for digging wells. In one week in late October, SJAC documenters reported that more than 20 FPV drones targeted Al-Atareb in western Aleppo, with most hitting civilian vehicles.

The above examples are not exhaustive – SJAC documenters received reports of many other drone attacks in Idlib and western Aleppo in October. Sustained attention to the government’s use of drones to target civilians is warranted, as the availability and low cost of these weapons allow government forces to easily continue to threaten and destabilize civilians’ lives in areas it seeks to recapture.

Civilians in HTS-controlled territory, particularly those who oppose HTS, also suffer from mistreatment at the hands of HTS and its security forces. In February 2024, civilians, many of whom are displaced from other areas of Syria, began protesting HTS actions including its widespread arbitrary detention practices and torture in its detention facilities. Key demands have included calling for Al-Jolani to step down, and for HTS leadership to free political prisoners and make reforms to the security services. While protests continued throughout the summer, the frequency of these protests began to decrease slightly later in the summer.

In October, documenters reported that protest activity was even lower than that of recent months. They assess that other ongoing events (displaced Syrian and Lebanese people arriving from Lebanon; Israeli bombardment in Syria) have taken precedence for civilians, causing protests against HTS to slow down. HTS reportedly continued to detain people this month, particularly those who are part of rival political/military groups (such as Hezb Al-Tahrir) or people involved in the protest movement against HTS, but documenters state that the volume of politically-motivated arrests appears somewhat lower than it has in recent months.