
Killing the Future
Targeting Schools by the Syrian Government
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Video Summary of the Report
Introduction
Education is a fundamental human right and every child deserves the opportunity to learn and grow in safety. Yet, in Syria, schools are deliberately targeted – many students have lost their lives and for others, education is indefinitely disrupted as school structures are destroyed. According to UNICEF , one in three schools inside Syria can no longer be used, and more than half of Syrian children are deprived of an education. This denial of education has harmful and long-lasting emotional, psychological, and educational effects. [1]
Schools are meant to be safe havens for students to learn and grow, however, in Syria, they are a battleground. Under international humanitarian law (IHL), schools are protected civilian objects, and like civilians, they cannot be directly targeted. All parties to the Syrian conflict are bound by IHL which requires the parties to take feasible measures to minimize civilian harm. While many parties to the conflict have targeted schools during the conflict, these attacks are most often perpetrated by the Syrian government. In 2014, the United Nations Secretary General found that the Syrian government was responsible for 65% of the school attacks it verified that year, [2] with that number increasing to 70% in 2015. [3] Moreover, unlike the other parties to the conflict, the Syrian government has the primary obligation to protect its population, especially the rights of children. [4]
In this report, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) presents never-before-seen government documents and analysis of open-source videos which show a policy of the Syrian government to target schools with reckless disregard for the lives of children that it knew or should have known were present. In addition to Syrian government intelligence documents, this report highlights four school attacks investigated by SJAC’s Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) team that shed light on the practice of targeting schools by the Syrian government. Although two of these attacks were previously reported by civil society and the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, SJAC’s report illustrates that these attacks were not isolated incidents. Rather, the systematic nature of the school attacks coupled with orders related to school attacks in Syrian government reports shows that these attacks were part of a policy to intentionally target these structures.
Methodology
To conduct this investigation, SJAC searched its repository of over 2 million videos related to the Syrian conflict contained within its database, Bayanat. SJAC’s OSINT investigators found nearly 1,500 pieces of information gathered from social media platforms and media outlets. Of these, 207 pieces of data were confirmed to relate to the targeting of schools by the Syrian government and its allies, while the remaining data was not sufficiently reliable. The content of the data varies – some showing attacks, others depicting the aftermath of attacks, and others contain corroborating information necessary to verify the attacks. SJAC’s investigators further obtained satellite imagery regarding these attacks.
From this data, SJAC’s investigative team thoroughly analyzed 11 of the incidents with the strongest evidence and documentation. This report highlights four cases containing the most robust evidence of intentional attacks by the Syrian government forces on schools.
The findings in this report are largely based on publicly available data. In certain cases, SJAC investigators also interviewed key witnesses and victims to the attacks. The Syrian government documents discussed in this report were obtained and analyzed by SJAC and are being made public for the first time.
Government Documents regarding School Attacks:
SJAC has identified 47 official Syrian government documents from SJAC’s collection that directly relate to their policy of targeting schools. Some of these documents contain direct orders to target certain schools, while others report on the execution of these attacks and the number of casualties. Due to a lack of publicly available data, SJAC’s investigators have not been able to verify all the attacks contained within these documents. However, regardless of the specific incidents, the wide array of official government documents planning and detailing attacks on schools point to a Syrian government strategy to deliberately and systematically target schools.
Of the 47 documents, 40 were issued by the Political Security Branch in Idlib pertaining to schools in the Idlib governorate. The remaining seven documents were issued by various governmental institutions and security branches in Daraa, including the Air Force Security Branch “Branch 265”, the Political Security Branch, and the Directorate of Education, and pertain to schools in the Daraa governorate. From these documents, SJAC’s investigators found evidence of damage to five schools aligning with the dates of their attacks. The Syrian government took credit for these attacks. Below are a few of the documents.
One document dated 13 September 2013 asserts targeting the Hasan Suheil school and The Females Secondary School in Ma’arraat Misrin by artillery.
Syrian Arab Republic
Ministry of Interior
Political Security Directorate
Political Security Branch/ Idlib
No. 4242/ b. s.
Date: 13/9/2013
Attn.: Political Security Branch – Information Division
Reference your official letter no, 6647/h.l., dated on 8/3/2013, requesting updates on the overall security developments in Idlib Governorate, kindly find below the requested information:
I. Overall Community Status: tense
II. Actions by the security agencies and army units (the Joint Unit):
- Idlib City:
· At 12 pm on 12/9/2013, two IEDs near the joint checkpoint at Idlib Corniche – Marteen junction were decommissioned, each weighing 25-30 kgs.
- Idlib Area:
· Through communication with our contacts in the area’s countryside regarding monitoring gatherings and movements by the armed terrorist gangs; we received the following details upon following up on the matter:
- Maraat Masreen sub-district: we learned about gatherings of armed terrorist gangs in the following sites:
1- A gathering near the western Corniche at 16:30 of the same date.
2- A gathering in Hassan Suheil Secondary (high) School at 11:51 of the same date.
3- A gathering at The Female Secondary School at 11:51 of the same date.
The coordinates of the aforementioned sites were identified. In coordination with the Military Operations Command (MOC), they were targeted by artillery fire; we will be briefing you on the outcomes later.
Three other documents report on attacks carried out by government forces on the Mohammad Al-Sadeq school in Binnish, Idlib. These attacks were carried out two days apart on August 7, 2013, and August 9, 2013.
1- Twelve (12) terrorists were killed, and others were wounded.
2- A pick-up vehicle (retrofitted) with a mounted machine gun.
Village of Kafr Jalis: groups of terrorists with their vehicles were spotted in a three-story building opposite the municipal building of the village; coordinates were identified, and the location was targeted with artillery fire in coordination with the Military Operations Command (MOC) at 18:00 on 7/8/2013. The operation culminated in the following results:
1- Six (6) terrorists were killed.
2- Twenty (20) other terrorists were wounded, including serious injuries.
3- Two pick-up vehicles retrofitted with DShK machine guns were destroyed.
Saraqib sub-district: our source provided us with the following locations:
1- Adjacent military posts of Jabhat Al-Nusrah terrorist organization south of Saraqib.
2- A gathering of terrorists north of the old police station (sentry).
3- A new headquarters of the so-called “Sharia Court” located next to the new police station at Saraqib.
Coordinates of the mentioned locations were identified, and they were targeted with artillery fire at 21:26 on 7/8/2013 – in coordination with Military Operations Command; most targets were directly hit, and many were killed or wounded – details to follow later.
We have also learned about a gathering inside a terrorist post at Al-Wazeer Mill to the northeast of Saraqib; coordinates of the site were identified, and it was targeted with artillery fire in coordination with Military Operations Command at 13:56 on 7/8/2013; detailed outcomes will follow later.
Benesh sub-district: we learned about the following:
1- A post of terrorists affiliated with Jabhat Al-Nusrah located next to Al-Hussein Mosque.
2- Another post of terrorists from the same organization located at Mohammad Al-Sadiq School.
Coordinates of the two locations were identified, and they were targeted with artillery fire in coordination with Military Ops at 21:26 on 7/8/2013; the shelling was a direct hit to the targets and detailed outcomes will follow later.
In Benesh as well, we learned of a gathering of terrorists and their vehicles in downtown; coordinates were identified, and location was targeted with artillery fire in coordination with Military Ops at 20:32 on 7/8/2013; it was a direct hit to the target and detailed outcomes will follow later.
In Ta’oum village of Benesh sub-district, we learned of an ammunition depot inside the Northeastern School of the village; coordinates of the mentioned site were identified, and the location was targeted with artillery fire in coordination with Military Ops at 22:00 hours on 7/8/2013; detailed outcomes will follow later.
Ariha Area:
- On 7/8/2013, as the military force detailed to Ariha-Al-Jisser Highway was combing the city of Ariha, many IEDs were decommissioned in the city roads and inside the People’s Army Building as indicated in the information on the matter. Combing and investigating activities are still underway in Ariha, and our forces continue to advance in the area as they are almost done with combing the city and are preparing to comb Jabal Al-Arbaeen Mount. The police force (NCOs and staff officers) in Ariha were re-instated to deliver on their functions in the city alongside members of the People’s Committees.
- Road maintenance vehicles are still working on rehabilitating and maintenance of the public highway.
Ma’arrat Al-Nu’man Area:
The assigned military force is still going after the remnants of the armed terrorist gangs in Ma’arrat Al-Nu’man city and countryside as well as in the vicinity of the Army command post at Wadi Al-Dheif and Al-Hamdiyah alongside other locations on the international highway; the force on the ground is accompanied by fighter jets and attack helicopter. The clashes are still going on, albeit, sporadic in some areas – resulting in the destruction of some cars used by the terrorists, killing and wounding a number of them.
I. Actions carried out by the armed terrorist groups:
- Idlib City
2) Two (2) pick-ups with mounted machine guns were destroyed.
In Benesh sub-district: we learned of terrorist gatherings and HQ/ posts in the following locations:
1- A terrorist post at Mohammad Al-Sadiq School.
2- A post next to the water tower.
3- A terrorist post at Al-Fou’ah crossroad.
4- Terrorists gathering southeast of Shu’aib Mosque.
Coordinates of the aforementioned locations were identified, and they were targeted with artillery fire in coordination with Military Ops at 13:45 on 9/8/2013; the outcomes were as follows:
1- Twelve (12) armed terrorists were killed, including a terrorist identified as (name redacted), and many others were injured – some seriously.
2- Three (3) pick-up vehicles with machine guns of various calibers were destroyed.
We have also learned of a terrorist gathering inside (Adel Zaman Palace) on the Idleb-Benesh road; the coordinates of the mentioned site were identified, and the location was targeted with artillery fire in coordination with Military Ops at 20:42 on 9/8/2013; it was a direct hit to the target and details will follow later.
Saraqib sub-district: we learned of terrorists gathering in the following areas:
1- A post for armed fighters of Jabhat Al-Nusrah terrorist organization in Al-Qirbat Neighborhood, west of Saraqib.
2- A post for foreign terrorists next to Sheikh Sa’ed Mosque.
Coordinates of the two locations were identified, and they were targeted with artillery fire in coordination with Military Ops at 15:10 on 9/8/2013; the two locations were directly hit, and we will be providing you with the results later.
Ariha Area:
On 9/8/2013, the military force tasked with combing Ariha ceased its operations in the area and, as information indicates, headed to Latakia Governorate. With regards to Ariha City, the people’s committees were formed of ….. (Sentence ends; no second page).
Satellite images before and after these specific attacks show damage to the Mohammad Al-Sadeq school:
While these are only a few examples of the information contained within these documents, they illustrate that the Syrian government has a policy of deliberately and systematically targeting schools. Within this policy, they may target the same school up to four times within a few months, or sequence attacks one right after the other. The possibility cannot be excluded that some of these schools housed armed militants and SJAC was unable to determine whether children in fact occupied the premises at the time of the attacks described in these documents. Some of these attacks were carried out during summer months which lessens the possibility that children were attending school at that time. However, once the Syrian government began systematically and deliberately targeting schools as a matter of policy, the government incurred a responsibility under IHL to ensure that the schools were no longer functioning and not occupied by students. As shown by the incidents described below, the Syrian government continued to attack schools even when it knew or should have known that they were occupied by students, and not militants, resulting in many children’s deaths and violations of IHL.
Incidents
1. Ibn Al-Tufail School
On September 29, 2013, the Ibn Al Tufail school, also known as the “Commercial Secondary School,” in Raqqa was targeted by airstrikes, causing civilian casualties and severely damaging the school building. While SJAC cannot independently verify the perpetrators of this attack, Human Rights Watch and The Telegraph reported that it was perpetrated by the Syrian government based on suspected weapon type. [5] The Violations Documentation Center (VDC) documented 16 civilian casualties from this attack. [6]
In one video recorded a day or two after the attack, a man who claims to have been inside the school during the airstrike explains how the attack resulted in many casualties, whose bodies “turned into pieces.” This eyewitness, and the videographer, both explicitly state that the attack took place during official school hours when students were present.
In the picture below, one can see a street-level view of the structures depicted in the previous satellite image:
On the internal walls of the school , one can see the name of armed opposition group, Jabhat Al-Nusra, and the name of their court, Shariah Committee, spraypainted. The Shariah Committee is responsible for enforcing the law in areas controlled by Jabhat Al-Nusra. It is possible that this spray-paint indicates that the group was utilizing the school. However, SJAC’s investigators found no evidence that Jabhat Al-Nusra was present in or around the school, or that the school was being used for any military purposes. It is also possible that the writing of Shariah Committee on the walls indicates that the court was operating out of the school. According to the following posts – 1 , 2 , and 3 – the Sharia Committee was the party responsible for all administrative matters inside Raqqa at the time of the school attack. Because the Shariah Committee is an administrative body that handles civilian matters and is comprised by unarmed judges who are not engaged in hostilities, the Committee is a civilian object. [7] It is unclear whether the Shariah Committee was operating out of the school, however, the school was filled with children attending class during the time of the attack. Even if the Shariah Committee were present, the school would remain a civilian object that cannot be targeted. [8]
This attack caused serious casualties amongst the children attending school, with many dead and injured, and the school structure seriously damaged. Videos purportedly taken shortly after the attack depict the aftermath : bodies are strewn across the schoolyard, their corpses maimed and torn to shreds. All casualties appear to be civilians – there is no visual evidence that they were armed, and they appear to be wearing regular clothes. The direct aftermath of the airstrike on the school is seen in three videos ( 1 , 2 , and 3 ) which show damaged walls, rubble, and/or blood throughout the remains of the school and immediate surroundings. Video 3 shows large craters in the schoolyard caused by the airstrikes:
The evidence shows concrete damage caused to the school and its surroundings, and the harm caused to children. If Syrian government officials were not aware that Ibn Al-Tufail was an operational school, local and international media reporting on the extent of death and destruction after the event made it explicitly clear. This should have moved the Syrian government to take further precautions in its conduct of hostilities to avoid targeting innocent, non-combatant, children. Instead, attacks on schools persisted.
2. Subhi Al-Masri School
On December 22, 2013, the city of Marea, in northern Aleppo, was bombed by warplanes. Five airstrikes hit the city resulting in destruction of the Subhi Al-Masri primary school, the Marea cultural center, and several civilian residential homes. These attacks were likely part of a broader strategy of intensifying government-led attacks on Aleppo that started a month prior. [9] Between November and December 2013, government forces attacked civilian objects like residential and shopping areas, with no apparent military objective. [10] While SJAC was not able to independently verify the perpetrators, the Subhi Al- Masri attack bears the hallmarks of yet another Syrian government attack on civilians and their infrastructure. [11]
The Subhi Al-Masri school is in the middle of an urban neighborhood and is located inside a complex containing multiple schools. The numerous attacks on civilian structures within the same day suggest a deliberate strategy to eradicate some of the key institutions that make up the fabric of the city. It is unclear whether the school was directly attacked or whether it faced significant damage due to the attack on the civilian homes in front of the school. Regardless of the specific target, the government consciously disregarded a real risk that bombing a nearby target would cause significant collateral damage, including by killing school children in their classrooms during regular school hours.
At the entrance of the school , one can see the logo of the armed opposition group, At-Tawheed brigade. While this may indicate that the group was utilizing the school, SJAC’s investigators found no evidence of military presence within or around the school. Instead, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that the school was being used only for civilian purposes with many school children present during regular school hours. According to the VDC, four people were killed by the attacks. [12] In addition to casualties, at least five children were found injured in their classroom.
According to children interviewed shortly after the attack by the Shahba Press Agency, they were in their classroom when the warplanes bombed the houses directly in front of the school. At that point, the teachers began to evacuate students from the classrooms. Once outside, the students kept hearing warplanes bombing the nearby area three more times. One of the children holds up a metal remnant and claims that it is shrapnel from the barrel that hit the school.
SJAC’s investigators used satellite images to verify the location of the school. As seen below, the red square is a complex housing multiple schools, including the Subhi Al-Masri school, depicted as a green square. The orange square contains the civilian houses that were attacked just prior to the school. With these before and after pictures, the extent of damage to the civilian houses and the school is evident:
In the aftermath of the first airstrike on the city , many people, including students and children, panic as they run away from smoke billowing from the direction of the school. Children can be seen running away from the rubble, clutching books and backpacks, and yelling as smoke fills the area. Others are stuck under the rubble of their classrooms which collapsed in the attack. As the injured children are rescued and evacuated, their blood and injuries are evident on camera.
In addition to children’s deaths, the destruction caused to the school's structure and the classrooms was extensive. Videos 1 and 2 demonstrate the vast damage done to the structure of the Subhi Al-Masri school and the surroundings. Inside the school , crumbling walls and crushed desks are seen, as children gather their belongings and pack their backpacks. Students of many ages are seen throughout the video, confirming that the school was functioning and in use when it was attacked.
The airstrikes also caused extensive damage to the houses directly in front of the school and the Marea cultural center. Videos 3 and 4 show the destruction of the residential houses and people pulling bodies from the rubble. In video 3 , the sound of an explosion is heard, which the videographer states is the third airstrike on the city. Lastly, video 5 shows the damage to the Marea cultural center.
Satellite images of the cultural center can be seen in the pictures below, where the shows the school complex that houses the Subhi Al-Masri school, and the shows the cultural center.
In combination, the numerous attacks on civilian structures – the school, houses, and the cultural center – within the same day show an intent to target key civilian institutions in violation of IHL. Like the other school attacks, here, the Syrian government knew or should have known that the school was functioning and filled with children when it attacked during regular school hours. While it is possible that the school was indirectly targeted, the Syrian government nonetheless disregarded the significant collateral damage, in the form of children’s deaths, that would likely occur by targeting a nearby civilian object.
3. Al Hayat School
On November 5, 2014, the Al- Hayat primary school in the Al-Qaboun neighborhood of eastern Damascus was attacked. [13] In November 2014, the Al-Qaboun neighborhood was under a truce between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian government forces. [14] Despite this ceasefire, the neighborhood's primary school, Al-Hayat, was bombed. According to the Syrian Human Rights League, the Syrian government was the perpetrator of this attack. [15] While SJAC cannot verify this information, Al-Qaboun neighborhood posed a strategic interest for the Syrian government who was also responsible for large-scale strikes on the neighborhood throughout 2014. [16] A statement condemning the attack as the “latest in a series of indiscriminate attacks on schools” was issued by the UNICEF representative for Syria, Hanaa Singer . The representative goes on to say that attacks in certain areas may have been “deliberate.” [17]
Al-Qaboun has been subject to a series of attacks throughout the Syrian conflict. Once the site of large, peaceful demonstrations against the Assad government, the formation of armed factions led to many groups competing for the neighborhood. Its location near major highways and on the eastern outskirts of the city, as well as its proximity to military installations and government-held areas, made it a valuable area to control various access routes. Due to its strategic significance, many attacks and atrocities have occurred in Al-Qaboun neighborhood, such as the one described here. [18]
A former resident of Al-Qaboun explained to SJAC that this attack was particularly devastating because nearly all families living in the neighborhood sent their children to this school. [19] He stated that “there is not a single house in the Qaboun neighborhood that does not have an injured or deceased child as a result of that attack.” The VDC reported that fifteen children died due to this attack while many others were severely injured. [20]
A child eyewitness described the attack in an online video recorded by the Syria Revolutionaries Gathering organization, as follows:
We were in the classroom, and it was the time of Al-Dhuhur prayer. The teacher asked some of us to go and perform ablution, and my friends went out to do so. Meanwhile, we heard the sound of a shell in the sky, we hid, and the shell hit. I took cover under my chair. When I looked after a short time, I found that many of my friends were lying dead, some of them were crying and some were injured, blood and flesh filled the place. I still cannot forget that scene today.
At the time of the attack, the Al-Qaboun neighborhood was supposed to be protected by a truce between the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian government. [21] According to an eye witness [22] SJAC interviewed, the Syrian government forces did not respect the truce, and after failed negotiations between the two groups, the government attacked the school. The eyewitness [23] explains that the government forces attacked the school, around noon, when all students and teachers were present. Parents heard the news of the attack and ran to the school to check on their children. Teachers and students rushed out of the building when another rocket hit the roof of the school just two minutes later.
This eyewitness described the experience of trying to find his little brother in the aftermath of the attack to SJAC:
When I arrived…The scene was horrific. Parents’ and mothers’ cries and screams were loud, the destruction, smell of blood, smoke, and rubble filled the place. I could not find my brother, so I and others headed to the field hospital (Al Hayat Hospital) … I did not see my brother among the wounded. I searched for him and found him lying on the ground. He had passed away as many shrapnel had hit his head. I carried the body of my younger brother…. and took him to our mother, who bid him farewell to be carried to his final resting place.
Due to the highly graphic nature of the evidence SJAC’s investigators found, no pictures are included in this report. Video 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , and 6 all show graphic images of dead children with clear wounds and blood. Witnesses in all these videos allege that the children were killed by the Syrian government attack on the Al Hayat school. In this video , people move injured and incapacitated children into and out of a medical facility, claiming that the children were injured by the school attack. Children’s bodies are seen lifeless and covered in blood.
SJAC’s investigators geolocated the school through photos of the building and the area surrounding it published by the school’s official Facebook page. Key features, such as the appearance of high-voltage cables, helped verify the location.
The satellite image of the area can be seen below, with the school depicted in blue and the high-voltage cables depicted in orange.
This incident shows yet another devastating consequence of the Syrian government’s policy to deliberately and systematically target schools. While SJAC cannot independently verify the perpetrator, based on the neighborhood and the patterns of attack, this is likely another attack by the Syrian government. Although the government knew or should have known that the school was filled with children when it attacked at noon during a school day, the government proceeded with a horrific attack resulting in the deaths of 15 children.
4. Ain Jalut School
On April 30, 2014, the Ain Jalut primary school, located in Aleppo, was bombed. [24] On the day of the attack, the school was hosting a painting exposition, “Imprint of Hope,” gathering students and school staff to exhibit their artwork. Meant to encourage talented children, teachers displayed pieces of artwork in celebration of children’s hopes for the future on the classroom walls. According to Amnesty International , local media publicized the event, and an invitation was circulated on Facebook . [25] Five minutes before the exposition was supposed to begin, the school was bombed at 8:55am. The VDC documented 23 deaths due to this attack. [26]
The Ain Jalut attack was widely reported in the media. Amnesty International , The International Center for Transitional Justice , and Reuters point to the Syrian government forces as the perpetrator. [27] According to Reuters, this strike appears to be “part of the sustained bombardment of the contested northern city [Aleppo] by Assad’s forces.” [28] The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria also states that the Ain Jalut school was attacked once before on August 6, 2013, presumably by Syrian forces. [29]
At the time of the attack, the Syrian government had declared a multi-day truce in the city of Aleppo, known as the “Electricity Cease Fire” between the Syrian government, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). [30] As part of this truce, the FSA and HTS, who then controlled the thermal power stations, would provide electricity to neighborhoods under the control of the Syrian government. [31] In return, the government would refrain from bombing the neighborhood of Aleppo. [32] According to an eyewitness SJAC interviewed, there were no attacks during the first few days of the truce, which provided a sense of reassurance, however this quickly changed. [33]
An eyewitness, Osama Al-Fandi , described the school attack in a recorded interview:
The exhibition was scheduled to begin at 9am, we were not too afraid of the warplanes because on that day the regime declared a truce in the city of Aleppo for several days. The planes started flying over us at 8:45 in the morning, but as mentioned, we were not very afraid. At that time there were many people and students and teachers who came to the school. I was preparing for the exhibition. We heard the sound of an explosion and thought it was far away. We thought the sound was one of the clashes and thought about the alleged truce. 10 minutes later, at 8:55, the school was bombed. The first thing we heard was a loud sound, and we no longer saw anything, we did not know that it was a bombing. Smoke filled the place, and the Civil Defense and an ambulance came and started removing the bodies. Body parts were everywhere, and we were living in a state of terror.
One of the student girls injured in the attack described her experience in a recorded interview:
We were in Ain Jalut school training for the painting expo when the warplane came and bombed us. We covered our ears and did not hear anything; we just saw flames in front of us. My friends and I could barely be taken to the hospital.
In the photo below, children’s paintings are exhibited on the classroom wall in preparation for the exposition that never occurred:
Satellite images of the area before and after April 30, 2014, confirm the attack on Ain Jalut School. In the pictures below, the red square encompasses the entire school structure, and the yellow rectangle captures the specific wing of the school that was attacked. On the image taken after the attack, on May 23, 2014, it is evident that the attacked school wing was completely destroyed.
The aftermath of the attack was brutal. In an interview with SJAC, one of the school’s staff members described his experience:
We tried to open a way to transfer the wounded to the hospitals and help those who were still alive among the students. No words can describe that scene, it was terrible. There were many corpses of children, the smells of blood and the crying of other children filled the place. [34]
A member of the Syrian Civil Defense Force (the “White Helmets”) explains the attack , stating:
The MiG [35] warplanes bombed this school at 9:00 am, which was full of children, there are more than 15 dead bodies, and we are still searching for others under the rubble. There are more than 50 children under the rubble, and we are searching for them.
The Syrian Civil Defense continued pulling bodies from the rubble until 4:00 am when they were able to retrieve the last two student girls. Various videos ( 4 , 5 , and 6 ) show the corpses of people killed in the attack on the school, including many children. Specifically, video 6 shows many dead children inside the damaged school, making it unlikely that the children died from any cause other than this attack. In video 4 , the investigative team counts 11 bodies of those killed by the attack.
In the aftermath of the Ain Jalut attack, there were conflicting reports as to whether armed combatants were located in or around the school. According to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria , a building in the same school complex was being used by fighters affiliated with Ansar Al-Aqida. In another report , where the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria collected victim testimonies, one victim stated that the school was being used as a sleeping shelter for about 50 lightly armed, Ansar Al-Aqida men. Alternatively, Amnesty International reported that a non-state armed group had used a barracks 100 meters from the school but that it may have been abandoned 3 months prior to the attack. Based on visual and video imagery collected by SJAC’s investigators, there is no evidence to suggest that the school itself was used for any kind of military purpose. It would also have been unusual for Syrian parents to send their children to a school that was occupied by opposition fighters. As such, SJAC did not find any evidence of the alleged barracks. On the contrary, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that the school was functioning and in use during the attack. According to Amnesty International , no deaths of any fighters were recorded due to the attack. Lastly, even if armed fighters had occupied the barracks 100 meters from the school, the IHL principle of proportionality requires the attacker to assess the risk of civilian casualties as a result of the attack. The danger of slaughtering innocent children should have weighed heavily in such an analysis.
Additionally, based on the evidence below of the weapon remnants and the extent of the destruction and casualties, SJAC’s investigators concluded that a Russian highly explosive bomb, such as the FAB-250 or FAB-500 M62 Aircraft bomb, was used to carry out this attack. Because these weapons have such a large blast and fragmentation zone, parties are prone to using these weapons indiscriminately. [36] If the Syrian government did attempt to target a nearby legitimate military target, it needed to consider the devastating consequences of using a weapon with such wide effects in an urban area near a primary school.
This is another example of the devastating consequences of the Syrian government’s policy to deliberately target schools. Video footage documents people gathering to commemorate those who died in the Ain Jalut school attack. The names of two teachers are mentioned: Mohammad Mahmoud Daqqaq and Bashar Ghafri. According to a former staff member of the Ain Jalut school, this attack marked a significant turning point in the educational system of Aleppo: the school closed permanently, and students had to resort to using the basements of other buildings to receive an education. [37]
Legal Analysis
By carrying out the school attacks highlighted in this report, the Syrian government blatantly violated key principles of IHL. Based on the principle of distinction, all parties to the Syrian conflict must distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects. [38] While military objectives are legitimate targets, civilian objects are protected. [39] Schools are civilian objects and therefore cannot be directly targeted. [40] In this report, all four structures attacked were functioning schools filled with children attending class. This is confirmed by ample video evidence showing children going back into their destroyed classrooms to pick up their school supplies and backpacks, in addition to video evidence showing children stuck under the rubble of their classrooms and being taken away with clear signs of injuries. Lastly, SJAC also collected testimonial evidence from staff and students that explain how the attacks occurred during the ordinary course of their school day.
Based on the available information, the Syrian government knew or should have known that they were targeting schools, a protected civilian object, in violation of IHL. SJAC’s investigators collected evidence to suggest that the Syrian government directly and deliberately targeted these schools. This evidence includes (1) official documents from the Syrian government; (2) repeat attacks on the same school in quick succession; (3) repeat attacks on the same school at different points in the conflict; and (4) a pattern of attacking protected civilian objects.
SJAC’s investigators acquired official documents from the Syrian government that detail and plan school attacks. Based on the wide array of official documents, the Syrian government deliberately and systematically targeted schools as a matter of policy. Once the government undertook this policy, it had to be certain that the targeted schools, as protected civilian objects, were no longer in use. However, as the incidents outlined in this report show, the Syrian government continued to attack functioning schools and violating the principle of distinction.
Further, repeat attacks on the same school in quick succession can demonstrate deliberateness. For example, in the case of the Al-Hayat school, two missiles were utilized within a two-minute timeframe. While it is possible that one missile accidentally hit the school, this is not likely to happen twice. Similarly, repeated attacks on the same school at different points throughout the conflict also demonstrate an intention to specifically target the school. For example, the Ain Jalut school was first targeted on August 6, 2013, and then 9 months later, on April 30, 2014. It is possible that the government may have mistakenly targeted the school the first time but a mistake like this is unlikely to happen again just 9 months later.
Lastly, a pattern of attacking civilian objects can also point to deliberateness. For example, the city of Marea was bombed by five airstrikes on December 22, 2013, hitting different civilian objects throughout the city, including the Subhi Al-Masri school. All throughout the month leading up to the school attack, government forces were targeting other civilian objects like residential and shopping areas with seemingly no military objective. While it is possible that the Syrian government was aiming to target military objectives, the number of attacks on civilian infrastructure, along with government documents detailing and planning attacks on schools, makes it more likely that the government was aiming specifically for civilian structures. SJAC has also previously reported on the Syrian government targeting other civilian structures, in both double-tap and repeated attacks, including healthcare facilities and internally displaced persons camps. [41]
Based on SJAC’s investigation, it is likely that all four schools were deliberately targeted by the Syrian government, and therefore these attacks violated IHL by failing to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects. However, while schools as civilian objects are protected, schools may lose this protection by becoming a military objective. [42] A school may transform into a military objective if it is used for military purposes. For example, in Syria, some schools may be used by armed groups to house fighters, which may transform their nature. According to the visual and video imagery collected by SJAC’s investigators, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the schools highlighted in this report were used for any kind of military purpose. On the contrary, there is ample video, imagery, and testimonial evidence to suggest that all the schools were functioning and in use during the time of their attacks. However, even if any of the schools had become military objects, the attacks would still violate IHL because they would violate the principle of proportionality.
Under the principle of proportionality, the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects may not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that an attack may have. [43] This principle limits harm to civilians, even when they, or their objects, are incidentally targeted. For example, in the case of the Ain Jalut school, even if the nearby barracks had been used by non-state armed groups, the Syrian government should have conducted a proportionality analysis before the attack to measure the military advantage of the attack against the magnitude of harm to civilians or “collateral damage.” The small number of alleged fighters in the barracks might have given the Syrian government a small military victory while risking the death of hundreds of noncombatant children. Thus, the attack would have been prohibited under the proportionality principle of IHL as well. That said, there was no evidence that fighters were killed in the attack, only children and their teachers were casualties of this school attack.
Moreover, in the case of the Ain Jalut school, the attack was carried out by using a Russian general purpose aviation bomb, also known as a highly explosive weapon. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs , when these weapons are air launched and used in populated areas, civilians account for 95% of recorded deaths and injuries due to the weapons’ large blast and fragmentation zone. Using a weapon that is more likely to result in indiscriminate killing should have also factored into the Syrian government’s proportionality analysis.
Whether or not the school attacks were deliberate, the amount of destruction and loss of civilian life violates key principles of IHL. In the cases outlined in this report, all the schools were targeted during regular school hours while classrooms were full of children. It is unclear what concrete and direct military advantage this kind of targeting could provide, if any. However, by targeting innocent children, these attacks seem to maximize civilian harm, rather than limit it, and therefore violate IHL.
Conclusion
The loss of student and teacher life, the destruction of educational facilities, and the deprivation of education are some of the most long-lasting consequences of the Syrian conflict. The four school attacks highlighted in this report are meant to shed light on the practice of targeting schools by the Syrian government – the actor most frequently responsible for these kinds of attacks. With no regard for key principles of IHL, these attacks were carried out deliberately and systematically by Syrian government forces while children were attending school. These attacks will have devastating and far-reaching consequences on children, families, and society at large. Unfortunately, the incidents in this report represent only a small portion of school attacks in Syria.
Like most of the crimes committed by state actors throughout the Syrian conflict, no venue is currently available for victims to seek accountability. Under certain circumstances, it is possible for the individuals who issued orders for school attacks or carried them out to be prosecuted for war crimes in other countries under universal jurisdiction. [44] However, at most, this would represent a small fraction of cases. Most likely, senior leadership and widespread prosecutions will remain out of reach until the ICC is granted jurisdiction or some other type of tribunal is created. Until then, SJAC will continue to document the realities of the Syrian conflict, laying the groundwork for future transitional justice opportunities.
[1] “Syria: Children Struggle with Physical and Psychological Scars after 11 Years of War,” UNICEF, March 15, 2022, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/syria-children-struggle-physical-and-psychological-scars-after-11-years-war ; “What is the Impact of Attacks on Education?,” Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, https://protectingeducation.org/the-problem/what-is-the-impact-of-attacks-on-education/
[2] Of the attacks 60 attacks on schools verified by the UN in 2014, 39 were attributed to government forces; 9 to ISIS; 1 to the Free Syrian Army; and 11 to unidentified fighters. UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, A/69/926-S/2015/409, para. 202.
[3] Of the 69 attacks on schools and educational personnel verified by the UN in 2015, 48 were attributed to government forces and pro-government groups; 11 to ISIS; 10 to other armed groups; and 1 to an unknown party. UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/836-S/2016/360, para. 157.
[4] The International Center for Transitional Justice, “’We Didn’t Think it Would Hit Us’: Understanding the Impact of Attacks on Schools in Syria,” (2018), p.5, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/Report_Save_Syrian_Schools_English_Web.pdf ; Syria is a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child .
[5] Human Rights Watch, Syria: Fuel-Air Bombs Strike School, (October 1, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/01/syria-fuel-air-bombs-strike-school ; Sherlock, Ruth. “Syrian Regime dropped ‘vacuum bomb’ on school.”The Telegraph. October 1, 2013. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10347698/Syrian-regime-dropped-vacuum-bomb-on-school.html.
[6] See individually documented deaths at the Violations Documentation Center in Syria: https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96546#.V6Y4Abh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96545#.V6YuGbh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96453#.V6SsZ7h9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96454#.V6Srtrh9602
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96452#.V6OmiLh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96450#.V6OmAbh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96443#.V6OlZ7h9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96451#.V6OkiLh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96448#.V6Oj2Lh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96449#.V6OjArh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96441#.V6Ohe7h9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96446#.V6Ogsrh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96447#.V6Of-bh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96445#.V6Odyrh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96444#.V6Oa2rh9603
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/96442#.V6OYfLh9603
[7] ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 9: Definition of Civilian Objects, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule9 ; ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 8: Definition of Military Objectives, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule8
[8] ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 10: Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule10
[9] Human Rights Watch, Syria: Dozens of Government Attacks in Aleppo, (December 21, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/21/syria-dozens-government-attacks-aleppo ; “Syrian Regime Attacks kill Dozens in Aleppo,” Alarabiya News, (December 22, 2013), https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2013/12/22/Syrian-air-force-kills-42-in-Aleppo
[10] Human Rights Watch, Syria: Dozens of Government Attacks in Aleppo.
[11] The Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC), The 12 th Annual Report on Human Rights in Syria 2013, (January 2014), https://www.shrc.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/The-Report-A4-English.pdf , p. 10.
[12] Individually documented profiles by the VDC can be found here:
[13] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30011154
[14] SJAC Interview with Witness; Hadid, Diaa. "Mortar fire on Syria School Kills 13 Children.” AP News. November 5, 2014, https://apnews.com/article/b27d9218cfc64bd4869c5e4c4502770e .
[15] “Children Killed After Regime Targets Damascus School,” The Syrian Observer.
[16] Ibid; “Children Killed After Regime Targets Damascus School,” The Syrian Observer, November 6, 2014, https://syrianobserver.com/news/31724/children_killed_after_regime_targets_damascus_school.html
[17] United Nations, Attacks on Children ‘Horrific Reminder’ of Terrible Price they Pay in Conflict – UNICEF, November 7, 2014, https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/11/483062
[18] Ibid; “Several people have been injured and colossal destruction is being reported as regime warplanes bombard the district,” Shaam News Network, August 8, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/175386715842445/posts/553755991338847 ; “Assad forces are shelling the district with mortar shells. The minaret of Abu Bakr Siddiq mosque has been damaged as a result,” Shaam News Network, August 9, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/175386715842445/posts/554164491297997 ;
[19] SJAC Interview with Witness, January 3, 2023.
[20] The Violations Documentation Center documented the death of 15 children (13 provided by the documentation office in Al-Qaboon neighborhood and 2 other unidentified children), as follows: https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/138062/
[21] Hadid, Diaa. “Mortar fire on Syria school kills 13 children.” AP News. November 5, 2014, https://apnews.com/article/b27d9218cfc64bd4869c5e4c4502770e.
[22] SJAC Interview with Witness, January 3, 2023.; Hadid, Diaa. “Mortar fire on Syria school kills 13 children.”
[23] SJAC Interview with Witness, January 3, 2023.
[24] Raja Abdulrahim,
“Syrian Airstrike on Aleppo school kills students, others,” The Los Angeles Times, April 30, 2014, https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-wn-syria-airstrike-school-students-20140430-story.html
[25] Amnesty International, Syria: ‘Death everywhere’ – War crimes and human rights abuses in Aleppo, Syria, (May 5, 2015), p. 32, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1370/2015/en/ ;
[26] The Violations Documentation Center (VDC) documented each of the individual deaths below:
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120696/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120697/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120698/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120699/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120700/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120701/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120702/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120703/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120704/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120705/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120706/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120707/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120708/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120709/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120710/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120720/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120739/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120740/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120741/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/120742/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/121477/
https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/ar/details/martyrs/121478/
Alternatively, the UN found that 33 children were killed. UN Report of the Secretary-General, “Children and Armed Conflict,” A/69/926*- S/2015/409*, para 200, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_409.pdf
[27] “Air Strike on Aleppo school kills 18: Syrian Activists.” Reuters. April 30, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-aleppo-idUSBREA3T0PA20140430 ; Amnesty International, Syria: ‘Death everywhere’ – War crimes and human rights abuses in Aleppo, Syria, p. 30; The International Center for Transitional Justice, “’We Didn’t Think it Would Hit Us’: Understanding the Impact of Attacks on Schools in Syria,” p. 48.
[28] “Air Strike on Aleppo school kills 18: Syrian Activists.” Reuters.
[29] The International Center for Transitional Justice, “’We Didn’t Think It Would Hit Us’: Understanding the Impact of Attacks on Schools in Syria,” p. 49; See also Human Rights Council, “Selected Testimonies from Victims of the Syrian Conflict,” A/HRC/27/CRP.1, p. 12.
[30] SJAC Interview, April 6, 2023.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] SJAC Interview with Witness, September 26, 2022.
[35] MiG warplanes are Soviet military fighter aircrafts. The Encyclopaedia Brittanica, ”MiG: Soviet aircraft,” (April 17, 2013), https://www.britannica.com/technology/MiG-Soviet-aircraft
[36] Human Rights Watch, “Chechnya Conflict: Use of Vacuum Bombs by Russian Forces,” (February 1, 2000), https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/01/chechnya-conflict-use-vacuum-bombs-russian-forces
[37] SJAC Interview with witness.
[38] ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 1: The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule1
[39] Ibid.
[40] ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 9: Definition of Civilian Objects, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule9
[41] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, “Hunting the Wounded: Double Tap Strikes on Healthcare Facilities,” October, 25, 2022, https://syriaaccountability.org/hunting-the-wounded/
[42] ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 10: Civilian Objects’ Loss of Protection from Attack, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule10
[43] ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 14: Proportionality in Attack, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule14#:~:text=armed%20conflictsInterpretation-,Rule%2014.,military%20advantage%20anticipated%2C%20is%20prohibited.
[44] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC), “Universal Jurisdiction,” Accessed June 13, 2023. https://syriaaccountability.org/universal-jurisdiction/ .