Human Rights Violations in Syria - August 2024

In Daraa governorate, assassinations and other violent attacks against civilian and military personnel represent a major threat to security, with SJAC documenters noting a significant increase in these attacks beginning in late 2023, which has continued to persist in 2024. In August, local media reported a high volume of assassinations of civilians, which it generally attributed to “unknown militants.” Several young men with no military affiliation were reportedly assassinated this month, including a  young man  with special needs. Assassinations also targeted members of the government’s security and  intelligence  forces and individuals involved with local armed groups or  drug trafficking . Conflicts and clashes also regularly occur between rival armed groups in Daraa, such as extensive clashes in  Jassem  and  Inkhel  in July and August, and civilians are often killed or  wounded  in these clashes.

Government security and intelligence forces and unofficial government-affiliated bodies continue to cause hardship for civilians in Daraa. In August, armed members of the local population resisted this treatment in several violent incidents. In one case in  Mahajeh , armed locals  attacked  buildings belonging to the “popular committees” - groups of armed individuals operating on behalf of the government -  in response to these groups’ imposition of royalties and bribes on civilians, involvement in assassinations, and other violations committed against the population. People also attacked government-affiliated military posts and checkpoints in several locations in Daraa in August, which documenters and local media note is often in retaliation for security forces’  arrest  of civilians at checkpoints.

Another major phenomenon increasingly endangering and causing financial hardship for civilians in government-controlled territory is kidnapping, with the perpetrators often requesting a high ransom for the person’s release. SJAC has documented an increase in this pattern in Daraa governorate since 2023. In multiple instances in August, local media reported that civilians recently kidnapped in Daraa had been found dead (see  here  and  here ). In late August, two Jordanian men  disappeared  while driving through Daraa governorate while returning to Jordan from Damascus. Some outlets claimed that one of the men’s vehicles was sold outside of Daraa governorate following their disappearance, suggesting that the men had been kidnapped. Local  media  assessed that if the two men had been kidnapped, the perpetrators likely belong to one of several “gangs” in Daraa that collaborate with the Syrian government, but who secure their own sources of revenue through kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities. The untenable situation in Daraa, with civilians at risk of becoming collateral damage in clashes, or targeted victims of assassinations and kidnappings, continues to drive displacement. SJAC documenters note increasing numbers of Syrians from Daraa fleeing the country in an attempt to reach Europe.

In Suwayda governorate, civilians have held peaceful protests against the government since 2023, calling for reforms and regime change, which continued throughout the month of August. Protests occur on a continuous basis, but the most well-attended gatherings occur on Fridays. Aside from isolated incidents that resulted in the death of a protester and injury of another in  February  and  July  2024, respectively, the government’s security response to the protests has been relatively minor. At a few points since the protests began, certain events have hinted at a possible government military intervention in Suwayda, such as government reinforcements heading towards Suwayda earlier in 2024, but these periods of tension typically resolve within a few days.

Government military and intelligence detaining civilians remains common in Damascus and surrounding areas. Following arrest campaigns and raids it conducted in  Babila  last month, government military security and political security set up a temporary checkpoint in  Qazzaz  ,  checking IDs and  arresting  around 30 people, who were then taken to the  Palestine Branch/Branch 235 . Those arrested reportedly included men who had already  completed  military service, and media sources did not mention the reasons behind these arrests. Once in detention, civilians often face mistreatment, humiliation, and torture. In early August, media reported that two men had died under torture during their interrogations in government prisons shortly after being detained at temporary checkpoints in  Yalda  (Rif Dimashq governorate) on a series of charges, including evading military service.

Refugees returning to government-held areas are another subset of Syrians at risk of detention. Since April 2024, SJAC has documented a growing wave of refugees returning to Syria (including both “voluntary” return and  deportation ) from neighboring Lebanon and Turkiye. In August, local media reported that a Syrian man,  Abdullah Hussein Al-Akhras  ,  was killed in detention at  Sednaya prison . He was originally detained at an Air Force Intelligence checkpoint in Aleppo governorate less than a year ago, after being deported from Turkiye to northern Syria and attempting to return to his home in Daraa. Even passing through government-controlled territory places returnees at risk of detention. Any deportation of Syrians from Turkey to Syria, including to opposition-controlled areas in the north, places Syrians at risk. SJAC will continue to document instances of forced return and detention of refugees returning from both Lebanon and Turkiye.

Last month, the Autonomous Administration issued a new law that included a general  amnesty  that applied to more than 1,000 prisoners in Al-Hasakeh and Al-Raqqa governorates, and detainees continue to be released as part of this amnesty. Among other provisions, for the first time, the amnesty applied to many individuals accused of terrorism-related crimes, including ISIS affiliation, although the amnesty excludes ISIS leaders and those responsible for committing crimes resulting in death. Prisoners continued to be released as part of this pardon in August, including detainees from prisons in Al-Hasakeh and Al-Qamishli cities. Some reports circulated that prisoners being released were required to pay a fee to be released. SJAC documenters state that those prisoners being released for criminal charges would pay a fee as bail ($5-20), while those accused of ISIS affiliation but found not guilty being released with a “tribal guarantee.” In the coming months, SJAC will conduct interviews with individuals released as part of this amnesty and gain further information about their charges, trials, and the conditions required for their release.

The most significant violations in Deir Ezzor governorate this month involved a series of armed clashes between the SDF and fighters from prominent Arab tribes in the area, who were supported by the Syrian government forces and militias loyal to it. These events represent the largest clashes between the SDF and pro-government tribal fighters since  August 2023 . Reportedly at the  urging  of  Ibrahim Al-Hafl , the pro-government leader of the prominent Akedat tribe, tribal fighters  targeted  SDF-controlled villages of  Abu Hammam ,  Theban , and Al-Latwa beginning on August 6. By mid-August, local media reported that 18  civilians  had been killed, many from shelling by heavy weapons. In one particular incident, the pro-government tribal fighters’  shelling  of civilian homes in Al-Dahlah and  Jadeed Bakkarah  villages on August 9  killed  12 people, including multiple women and children. Though the most deadly fighting ended in mid-August, SJAC notes that tension and small clashes between the SDF and the government-backed fighters continued throughout August. 

Along with the high number of civilian casualties, the fighting caused profound consequences for civilians in Deir Ezzor governorate. The ongoing clashes caused  damage  to homes and displaced civilians from Theban, Abu Hammam, Al-Kishkiyah, Al-Dahlah, and several other villages. Water stations in Abu Hammam and Al-Sahba were rendered out of service due to the shelling as well. Retaliatory military action from the SDF also impacted civilians in government-controlled areas of Deir Ezzor governorate (on the western side of the Euphrates), with three children reportedly  injured  in Boqrus from SDF shelling. US-led Coalition forces have not engaged to restore peace or end the fighting, but some reports stated that the US has provided increased weapons to the SDF during these clashes.

In Al-Hasakeh governorate, local media documented the  murder  of 17-year old Nermin Abdullah Farho in  Al-Darbasiyah  ,  in a so-called “honor killing.” Following her murder, the Autonomous Administration-affiliated Star Conference, a women’s organization, held a  protest  to condemn violence against women and honor killing, and the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) reportedly opened an investigation into the murder. SJAC notes that while this violation garnered a public protest, such incidents do not always receive a response. For example, when an official affiliated with the Autonomous Administration reportedly sanctioned the  murder  of Rithaa Alsalman earlier in 2024 in another so-called honor killing, the Autonomous Administration was quiet.

One of the SDF’s primary objectives in the areas it controls is combating ISIS, which continued to demonstrate its presence via multiple attacks in August. ISIS attacks in SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ezzor governorate this month primarily targeted SDF members, such as one  IED attack  that injured two SDF members in Al-Jarthi. In response to these ongoing attacks, SDF/Asayish regularly launches security operations in its territory, one of which it conducted near  Al-Karama agricultural area  in Al-Raqqa in August. The SDF reportedly raided homes and  arrested  15 alleged ISIS-affiliated individuals in Al-Hasakeh city this month as well.

In August, the SDF continued to condone child recruitment in the areas it controls, which is conducted by an affiliated group called the Revolutionary Youth. Local media reported that the Revolutionary Youth  kidnapped  a 13-year-old girl from Al-Darbasiyah, in Al-Hasakeh governorate, in late August. Her family reportedly tried to intervene, but the group’s authorities  prevented  the family from having any communication with the girl. Other media reported that residents held a  protest  in front of the Revolutionary Youth headquarters in Manbij, Aleppo governorate, denouncing the group’s continued conscription of minors. SJAC has conducted several interviews with families of those kidnapped in similar circumstances, and detailed this pattern of violations more thoroughly in a public  report .

Violence resulting from the ongoing conflict in Syria resulted in several civilian casualties in Turkish-controlled areas in August. First, following a Turkish push to reopen the  Abu Al-Zindayn border crossing  (which connects Turkish-controlled Al-Bab with the Syrian government-controlled areas in eastern Aleppo, and would facilitate trade between the two areas) civilians in Turkish-controlled areas and members of SNA factions protested the opening of the crossing. Residents physically blocked the crossing to prevent its opening, and SJAC received reports that the Levant Front (Al-Jabha Al-Shamiya) faction shelled the crossing, and that three civilians were injured in this shelling.

SNA factions likely resist the crossing being opened due to the loss of revenue they would experience from the presence of an official border crossing, as these groups currently benefit financially from controlling smuggling that occurs between the two areas.  Civilian opposition to the crossing reportedly involves their desire to block any manifestation of normalization with the Syrian government, but SJAC notes that the Levant Front faction has also instigated some of these protests. By the end of August, the crossing had not reopened, but SJAC documenters anticipate that both Turkey and the Syrian government will continue to push for the crossing to reopen in the future.

IED explosions in  Azaz  and  Afrin  reportedly resulted in more than 20 civilian casualties in August. On August 7, an explosive device attached to a truck  exploded  at a crowded checkpoint in Azaz, killing nine people and wounding over 10 others. Later in August,  two  separate IED explosions in Afrin injured at least four people. The military police’s investigation into the Azaz explosion is still ongoing. In another incident, the Syrian Civil Defense reported that security forces stationed in an area jointly controlled by the SDF and Syrian government fired their weapons, seriously  injuring  a woman and a child standing across the river in a Turkish-controlled village near Jarablus on August 2. SJAC documenters note that such incidents are somewhat rare, but they have occurred in the past.

In August, the military police and members of various SNA factions continued to arrest civilians in Afrin and the surrounding area, a pattern that has occurred since Turkey and the SNA factions gained control of the area in 2018. SJAC has witnessed an increase in these cases in the past several months. The military police  arrested  at least four civilians in August, from villages near  Jinderis ,  Bulbul , Shirwa districts, and reportedly released some of them after their relatives paid ransoms. In many of these cases, the military police accuse detainees of past “cooperation with the Autonomous Administration,” which refers to actions taken when the area was controlled by the AANES prior to 2018. This charge does not always indicate that a person was involved with Kurdish politics or military factions. The military police have arrested people who were previously employed by the AANES in any capacity, including strictly civilian jobs as teachers, nurses, municipality employees, etc. SJAC is currently exploring this pattern of violations in greater detail.

SJAC also heard reports that members of the Suleiman Shah faction, also known as Al-Amshat, forced residents of  Maabatli  and  Sheikh Al-Hadid , near Afrin, to pay $100 USD per family to support “public services” in the area. SJAC received conflicting reports as to the alleged purpose of the fee, but local media reported that members of the faction  beat  and verbally harassed a group of civilians who were unable to pay the money.

Since February 2024, civilians living in HTS-controlled territory, many of whom are displaced from other areas of Syria, have protested HTS actions including its widespread arbitrary detention practices and torture in its detention facilities. Key demands include calling for Al-Jolani to step down, and for HTS leadership to free political prisoners and make reforms to the security services. While protests have continued throughout the summer, the frequency of these protests began to decrease slightly in July. In August, many of these protests consisted solely of women, who protested in Idlib city, Binnish, and other areas with similar demands to mixed-gender protests. SJAC documenters assess that women-only protests generally elicit a smaller response and intervention from HTS security forces than mixed-gender protests, which may be a reason for the shift. SJAC is currently compiling a list of reforms that the Salvation Government claimed it will undertake in response to the protests, which include adding visible numbers to uniforms of members of security services that would allow civilians to make complaints about specific members if they experience mistreatment.

Despite an official ceasefire truce signed in 2020, since late 2023, Syrian government forces and their allies, including Iranian-affiliated militias and Russian aircraft, continue to attack civilian targets in HTS-controlled areas and areas immediately surrounding it, including southern Idlib, along with parts of Hama and western Aleppo governorates. These attacks often result in civilian casualties and material damage to homes, livestock, farms, and vehicles. According to SJAC documenters, these attacks aim to demonstrate the Syrian government’s continued presence and intent to regain control of the entirety of Syrian territory, and to cause ongoing hardship for civilians. In August, government attacks on HTS-controlled territory caused multiple civilian casualties. In one particular incident on August 18, government forces  shelled  a medical supply facility for a humanitarian aid organization on the outskirts of Idlib city, injuring two people, including an employee of the aid organization.

In addition to traditional artillery and airstrikes, the Syrian government’s use of drones against civilian targets in HTS-controlled areas continued to increase in August. In addition to Russian and Iranian drones used in northwest Syria, government forces use primitive, locally-built first-person view (FPV) suicide drones to attack their targets, causing civilian casualties and significant material damage. In August, a series of drone attacks injured civilians throughout HTS-controlled territory and surrounding areas. In 5 villages near Sahl Al-Ghab, a series of government-launched drones destroyed civilian cars and in one case, injured 6 people from a single family. In another incident in western Aleppo, a group of 5 drones targeted civilian vehicles in Al-Atareb (see photos) and Kafr Nouran, destroying 3 vehicles and injuring a child. These two incidents represent a small fraction of drone attacks that occurred in August.

In some areas frequently targeted by drones, civilians have begun taking measures to combat the drones, such as firing shotguns filled with birdshot to take down the drones before they can reach their target. For example, residents of Maarat Al-Naasan reportedly shot down several of the drones launched toward it in August. This form of self-defense against drones, while occasionally successful, does not represent a sufficient protection against the Syrian government’s attacks. In the drone attack in Maarat Al-Naasan described earlier, civilians were still injured, two vehicles were destroyed, and the town’s water tank sustained damage. SJAC notes that government forces have merely increased the amount of drones they send to a given area to increase the likelihood of some of the drones successfully reaching a target and detonating.