Human Rights Violations in Syria - May 2024
Regions of control on the following maps are shown by sub-district and may not reflect the current situation on the ground
SJAC’s human rights violations map compiles data collected by our field team of documentation coordinators. Data is pulled from local media reports as well as interviews and conversations conducted by SJAC which would otherwise be inaccessible to a larger international audience. This map provides a thorough breakdown of the ongoing human rights situation in the territories of Syria’s four main political and military authorities. These include the Syrian Government, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, Syrian Democratic Forces / Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (SDF/AANES), and Turkish-occupied areas.
SJAC’s human rights map will be updated monthly with the most up-to-date information on human rights violations, major political events, and analysis of how the conflict is evolving.
May’s map includes details on the continued uptick in assassinations against civilian and military personnel in Government-controlled Daraa governorate; protests in Al-Hasakeh, Al-Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor governorates in response to an Autonomous Administration announcement setting the purchase price of wheat; mass arrest of predominantly Kurdish civilians in Turkish occupied Afrin and Azaz; and a concerning shift in government response to popular protests against the rule of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham.
Syrian Government-Controlled Regions
The Syrian government currently controls the majority of Syrian territory. In the south, which includes , , and governorates, government-affiliated military and security groups have been responsible for security since regaining control of the area in 2018.
In Daraa governorate, assassinations and other violent attacks against civilian and military personnel represent a major threat to security, with SJAC documenters noting a significant increase in these attacks in late 2023 and early 2024. In May, this high volume of assassinations continued to persist in Daraa. Casualties this month included both civilians with no military affiliation, along with people involved with local armed groups or the drug trade. As was the case in previous months, media outlets attributed many of these attacks on civilians in May to “unknown militants.” Conflicts and clashes also regularly occur between rival armed groups in Daraa, even if both groups operate on behalf of the government.
Local media outlets also highlighted multiple attacks on vehicles and facilities belonging to government political security and military units, along with a large number of attacks on civilians. One article noted that an IED attack which killed two members of the government’s state security forces in May was a deliberate attack on their vehicle in retaliation for these security forces’ treatment of the population. Both the article and SJAC documenters note that these security forces regularly humiliate and detain civilians, and force payment of royalties at checkpoints. At one major checkpoint, called “Mankat Al-Hatab,” located on the main road between Damascus and Daraa, government military security forces arrested four people coming from Damascus on May 27. In this case, one of the detained men was a member of a local armed group, which is supported by a rival government security unit, and members of this group retaliated in an attempt to prompt the arrested men’s release. Civilians are often forced to pay large sums of money to secure their relatives’ release.
Civilians in Suwayda governorate have held peaceful protests against the government since fall 2023, calling for reforms and regime change. While they are not currently as prevalent as they were at their peak in fall 2023, protests continued through the month of May, with smaller daily gatherings throughout the week and larger protests on Fridays. Aside from security forces’ killing of a civilian protester in February, government response to the protests in Suwayda has been relatively restrained overall. Media reports highlighted government military reinforcements heading towards Suwayda at the end of April, which some speculated may be in retaliation for Suwayda protests, but SJAC documenters noted that these reinforcements did not result in any military action in Suwayda in May.
Protests also occurred in , located in Homs governorate near Syria’s borders with Jordan and Iraq. For several years, the Syrian government and its allies have prevented food, medicine and other materials from entering the camp, which is home to roughly 7,500 displaced Syrians, causing camp residents to repeatedly protest. Following the government’s additional restriction on the entry of goods to the camp in April, and fewer aid supplies arriving in the camp from other sources, protests in the camp in May were reportedly larger than those in previous months. Residents called for humanitarian aid and medical treatment in the camp, and for the creation of a pathway for residents to leave the camp and travel to non-government controlled areas in northern Syria. Despite deplorable conditions in the camp, residents’ fear of passing through government controlled-areas (currently the only route out of the camp) to arrive in northern Syria dissuades them from leaving the camp.
Although numerous human rights organizations have proven the Syrian government’s use of torture prior to and throughout the current conflict, on May 27, the government’s Ministry of the Interior in Damascus issued a circular to the police, which instructed police not to use torture or other methods of coercion when dealing with suspects. SJAC documenters assess that the government decision to issue this order was likely sparked by the ongoing case against the Syrian government at the International Court of Justice, brought by Canada and the Netherlands, for Syria’s violation of the UN Convention Against Torture. This order only applies to the police, not the security or intelligence services, but it may be a government attempt to appear as though it has taken steps to ban torture in Syria.
Rif Dimashq governorate, home to several former opposition strongholds, witnessed mass government brutality and violations earlier in the war, including sieges, chemical weapons attacks, and pillage. While the government claims that individuals in some of these areas who were previously involved with the opposition may “reconcile” with the government, reconciliation is not a guarantee of safety. In May, the government’s Republican Guard arrested Fawaz Ramadan, a former leader in the opposition’s military council, when he passed through a checkpoint in . The article notes that Ramadan had completed reconciliation with the government. According to SJAC documenters, even if an individual has engaged in official reconciliation measures, if that individual were involved in opposition leadership (in a civilian or military capacity), he/she remains at risk of arrest and/or assassination by government security and intelligence services. SJAC has documented similar instances of detention in Damascus itself, along with other areas of Rif Dimashq and governorates in southern Syria.
SDF-Controlled Regions
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) governs parts of , , and governorates. Despite ongoing political and military support from the United States and other Western allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces and other affiliated military/security entities in this territory engage in significant violations against the population, including arbitrary detention and poor treatment of detainees. In May, SJAC’s documentation team interviewed an individual whom the SDF initially detained in Al-Haskaeh governorate. The SDF reportedly tortured him in detention and coerced him into confessing his supposed involvement with ISIS, although this individual had no ISIS affiliation. SJAC has documented numerous similar cases of civilians detained by the SDF and charged with ISIS involvement.
Other Autonomous Administration/SDF policies provoked civilian discontent this month. Civilians in Al-Hasakeh and Deir Al-Zour governorates protested the AANES decision to purchase wheat and other grains from farmers for $0.31 per kilogram, which is roughly 25% lower than last year’s rate, and 30% lower than the Syrian government’s rate. Civilians believe that Autonomous Administration officials will likely sell this wheat to the government to make a profit. According to documenters, farmers impacted by this policy will not be able to cover the costs of producing their crops this year, nor save any money for the next season. Some analyses linked the pricing decision to an SDF policy to discourage farmers from continuing to farm, potentially motivating them to give up their lands in the future. SJAC documenters state that protests could resume, as the Autonomous Administration announced that it will not reverse its decision on the price of wheat. In Deir Al-Zour, tension between the SDF and civilians caused civilian casualties in May. For example, when SDF members fired at a vehicle that refused to stop at a checkpoint in Darnaj, two children were killed. According to documenters on the ground, SDF checkpoints are widespread in the area, and members present at the checkpoints frequently harass civilians that pass through them. If civilians respond to this treatment, verbal and physical clashes can ensue, and it is not uncommon for civilians (including children) to become collateral damage in this violence.
The SDF also condones child recruitment, which is conducted by an affiliated group called the Revolutionary Youth. Media reports and statements to SJAC documenters in May discuss the Revolutionary Youth’s kidnapping of at least three children this month from Tall Rifaat , Manbij , and camps near Al-Shahba (Aleppo governorate), taking them to youth conscription camps. One of these children, a 13-year old girl, was taken on her way to school. SJAC has conducted several interviews with families of those kidnapped in similar circumstances, and detailed this pattern of violations more thoroughly in a public report . Young adults are also subject to forced conscription in SDF-controlled areas. In May, the SDF reportedly arrested nearly 50 young men at checkpoints in Al-Hasakeh governorate and took them to perform mandatory military service with the SDF. While the Autonomous Administration previously released a statement saying that it would no longer conduct raids to conscript people from their workplaces, markets/shops, or their homes, the SDF continues to stop young men at checkpoints and forcibly take them for military service. While some options exist for postponing military service, including for education, these exemptions are not always granted.
The Autonomous Administration had planned to hold municipal elections in late May, but postponed the elections until mid-June (which were later postponed again to July). Through these elections, civilians will select leaders of local government institutions, which are responsible for services in their areas, approving official documentation, etc. SJAC documenters in the area note that the postponement of elections leaves civilians in limbo on many administrative matters, without any means of getting final government approval on official documents until the elections are over.
Another major threat to civilians in Autonomous Administration-controlled areas, particularly northern parts of Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, and Al-Raqqa governorates, is ongoing Turkish shelling and drone attacks. While the level of Turkish military activity in May was comparable to that of prior months, these attacks continue to pose a threat to civilians in the area. For example, in Al-Samouqa village, located near SDF-controlled Al-Shahba (Aleppo governorate), Turkish shelling seriously injured two children, one of whom later died from his injuries.
Turkish-Controlled Regions
Following Turkiye’s incursions into Syria during Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch (2016-18), Turkiye and proxy forces under the Syrian National Army (SNA) have controlled areas of Northern Aleppo and regularly commit violations against civilian populations.
In May 2024, SNA factions reportedly arrested a number of civilians (mainly Kurdish) in Afrin and Azaz. These arrests are not a new phenomenon - they have occurred since Turkey and the SNA factions gained control of the area in 2018. Police detained an elderly Kurdish man in in May, on charges of previous “cooperation with the Autonomous Administration.” They beat him severely in detention, but released the man when his family paid money to those who detained him. SNA factions had previously arrested the man on the same charges, but released him upon being paid. In the previous example and many other cases, the charge of “cooperation with the Autonomous Administration,” refers to actions taken when the area was controlled by the AANES prior to 2018. Accusations of “cooperation” with the AANES could refer to actions such as performing mandatory military service required by the AANES “Self Defense” law, or working civilian jobs (teachers, nurses, municipality employees) for the Autonomous Administration.
In May, SJAC received several reports of civilians being detained without charges as well, including a man kidnapped from (near Afrin) who is being held without being charged. In many cases, including the elderly man in Maabatli above, the factions offer that the detainee can be released after paying a sum of money (typically thousands of dollars) to members of the Turkish-backed National Army factions who arrested them. According to SJAC’s sources, the arrests serve to intimidate the Kurdish population in northern Aleppo. Members of SNA factions also personally benefit from these detention practices, as they receive payments from detainees’ families in exchange for their relatives’ release.
Since the SNA gained control of the area in 2018, SJAC documenters have received regular reports of SNA factions committing housing, land, and property violations against the local population, particularly in Afrin. This month, members of the Al-Amshat faction looted the home in a village near Afrin, stealing items like doors, windows, and other goods. The Yazidi owner of several homes and a gas station in Shiran was forced to pay $20,000 to members of the Malak Shah faction to regain access to some of these properties. The remaining properties are still under the faction’s control. In the past few months, SJAC’s documenters have also received multiple reports of original owners attempting to reclaim their land and property, but being severely beaten and/or detained for doing so. For example, a Kurdish man recently returned to his home in Afrin city, which members of SNA factions forcibly occupied in 2018. In May, upon asking for his home to be returned to him, members of factions arrested him, and his current whereabouts remain unknown.
Members of SNA factions (along with Syrian IDPs) occupying civilian homes in Afrin and surrounding areas is a major concern, and this month, the legal system’s attempt to address this issue sparked massive backlash. In late May, Nowruz Hasso, a Kurdish judge in the criminal court in Afrin, issued an unprecedented ruling stating that those living in homes belonging to forcibly displaced Kurdish residents must leave the homes, returning them to their original owners. Soon after word of Hasso’s historic decision began to spread, displaced Syrians living in Afrin launched a smear campaign against her, holding protests and threatening her with rape and murder, and also threatening to harm her family. These threats circulated widely on social media. While some speakers at protests highlighted that the decision harms displaced Syrian civilians, who were squatting in these homes and have nowhere else to go, SJAC documenters note that protests of this size could not occur without approval and support from National Army factions operating in the area. Interestingly, protesters also accused the Kurdish judge of having a relationship with the AANES or PKK, but other articles and SJAC documenters point to Hasso’s positive relationship with the Turkish authorities in the area, given her position in the Turkish-run court system. SJAC will monitor this situation in the coming weeks, as it is unlikely that most/all of the implicated people will vacate the homes.
In a more positively received ruling, the military court in Al-Ra’i (Aleppo governorate) sentenced three men to death for the murder of activist Mohammad Abdel Latif (known as Mohammad Abu Ghannoum) and his pregnant wife, which occurred in 2022. Two of the three perpetrators are members of the Al-Hamzat faction which operates in northern Syria. As the death penalty is not enforced in Turkish-controlled territory, the three men are expected to serve life sentences for the murders.
Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham - Controlled Regions
Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), led by Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, is a nominally independent Islamist political and military organization that controls parts of Idlib governorate, operating politically as the “Syrian Salvation Government.” Civilians in HTS-controlled Syria regularly experience arbitrary detention and torture, as well as ongoing airstrikes and artillery fire from the Syrian government and allies.
Since February 2024, civilians living in HTS-controlled territory, many of whom are displaced from other areas of Syria, have protested HTS actions including its widespread arbitrary detention practices and torture in its detention facilities. In May, protests against HTS continued, calling for Al-Jolani to step down and for reforms to the security services. HTS/Salvation Government response to the protests had been relatively restrained from February-April, with Jolani and the Salvation Government making concessions and promises of reform. However, this response shifted in May, with greater security presence and occasional violent interaction between security forces and protestors. Throughout the month, protests occurred in Idlib city, Binnish, Ariha, Taftenaz, Barisha, the Kafrouma Camp in Killi, Hazano, Kafr Lousin, Al-Atareb, and Jisr Al-Shoghour.
In early May, police cleared a protest encampment in front of a courthouse in Idlib city, and the General Security reportedly injured some protesters with their sticks and clubs during the process. Security forces in large population centers increased their presence and implemented security cordons to prevent protests (Idlib city, Jisr Al-Shoughour, and Binnish) prior to anticipated Friday protests. At protests in Binnish and Jisr Al-Shoughour in mid-May, HTS members who infiltrated the protests reportedly beat demonstrators. Police arrested roughly 20 leaders of the protest movement throughout the month, and released some of them within a day or two of the arrest. Others remain in detention. SJAC documenters note that in May, accusations spread regarding other armed groups (HTS rivals) who endorsed the ongoing protests against HTS. Protests continued throughout the end of the month, and SJAC documenters expect them to continue beyond May, noting that civilians (both protesters and those not engaging) and the Salvation Government fear what may happen if “security chaos” were to occur if the situation escalates in the future, which could yield an uptick in ISIS activity in the area.
Despite an official ceasefire truce signed in 2020, since late 2023, Syrian government forces and their allies, including Iranian-affiliated militias and Russian aircraft, have ramped up attacks on civilian targets in HTS-controlled areas and areas immediately surrounding it, including southern Idlib, along with parts of Hama and western Aleppo governorates. These attacks often result in civilian casualties. According to SJAC documenters, these attacks aim to demonstrate the Syrian government’s continued presence and intent to regain control of the entirety of Syrian territory. Government forces also attack civilians in HTS-controlled areas as a means of retaliation for attacks that target government soldiers.
In May, Syrian government forces and their allies continued to use various types of artillery, including mortars and rockets, to target civilian areas. In just two of several documented incidents in western Aleppo this month, government shelling killed a 12-year old child and seriously injured his father, and government artillery fire seriously injured 7 people from a single family. Members of Lebanese Hezbollah reportedly fired a rocket at a civilian vehicle on a road in the same area, killing two children and wounding another. As in prior years, since May falls at the beginning of the harvest season, government forces targeted privately-owned farmland in HTS-controlled territory and the surrounding area. Government forces fired artillery and incendiary bullets at this farmland in Idlib, Aleppo, and northern Latakia, destroying large areas of crops in order to inflict economic hardship on civilians in this area, many of whom depend on agriculture for their main source of income.
Drone attacks pose another major threat to civilians in this area, and Syrian government forces have increased their use of drones against civilian targets in recent months. In addition to Russian and Iranian drones used in northwest Syria, government forces use primitive, locally-built first-person view (FPV) suicide drones to attack their targets. These explosive-laden drones, which operate by crashing into their targets, kill and injure civilians in Idlib and Hama governorates with increasing frequency as their range continues to increase. Rather than being GPS-controlled, an operator guides an FPV drone by viewing the area below remotely through a camera, and the drone cannot return once it is launched. For these reasons, FPV drones often hit civilian objects, such as when a series of four drones hit a civilian vehicle near Afes, injuring three people in mid-May.