Human Rights Violations in Syria - June 2024

In Daraa governorate, assassinations and other violent attacks against civilian and military personnel represent a major threat to security, with SJAC documenters noting a significant increase in these attacks in late 2023 and 2024. Conflicts and clashes also regularly occur between rival armed groups in Daraa (even if both groups operate on behalf of the government), and civilians have been injured or killed in these clashes.

In June, the high volume of assassinations continued to persist in Daraa, which outlets generally attribute to “unknown militants,” with documenters observing even greater reports of civilian deaths than in the past few months.

Civilian casualties this month included men with no military affiliation, along with their  wives  or  children  who were accompanying the targeted individuals at the time of the attacks. Kidnappings and assassinations this month also targeted several people involved with local  armed groups  or  drug trafficking .

Kidnapping for ransom is an increasingly dangerous phenomenon that is causing significant hardship for civilians. In mid-June, local media reported that an unknown group  released  a young man who they previously kidnapped in Daraa Al-Balad, after his family paid a sum of more than $50,000 to the kidnappers.

Rif Dimashq governorate, home to several former opposition strongholds, witnessed mass government brutality and violations earlier in the war, including sieges, chemical weapons attacks, and pillage. The government claims that individuals in some of these areas may “reconcile” with the government and return to their homes, however, incidents in Rif Dimashq in June demonstrate that reconciliation does not exempt these individuals from government violations (arbitrary detention, assassination), nor does it shield civilians in these areas from other dangerous impacts of the ongoing conflict in Syria.

Several years after its reconciliation with the government in late 2016, the town of Zakia is now witnessing a more pronounced government military presence, to which residents are generally resistant. In Zakia,  clashes  between local armed groups and members of the government’s 4th Division broke out on June 18, after government forces entered the town and attempted to meet with Hassan Ghadeer, a well-known drug dealer who is reportedly affiliated with the 4th Division. Members of the local groups burned homes belonging to Hassan Ghadeer in protest, and several members of the 4th Division were injured in the ensuing clashes, along with a 12-year old child.

Along with persistent threats to their physical safety, civilians living in formerly opposition-controlled areas often suffer from a lack of basic services due to infrastructure damage sustained earlier in the war, and continued government marginalization of these areas following their recapture. While some individuals have returned to their homes upon receiving the required “security approval” from the government, many in Rif Dimashq and southern Damascus lack access to clean drinking water and reliable electricity.

In June, local officials in Hammouriyeh in Eastern Ghouta stated that civilians are in danger of becoming sick after being forced to use water  contaminated  with sewage and  carcinogens , due to lack of repairs to the water infrastructure. SJAC documenters note that public services in government-controlled areas are typically poor, but that in the formerly opposition-held areas, the conditions are often worse. With the absence of government services, civilians in these areas are forced to undertake any tasks required to make their homes livable, such as removing rubble, obtaining water, etc., on their own, at considerable financial cost and potential risks to their health.

The Syrian government also controls Homs and Hama governorates, along with parts of Deir Ezzor and Al-Raqqa governorates, which include vast desert areas.

ISIS frequently conducts attacks in these areas, killing civilians who are herding livestock or gathering truffle mushrooms, and also targeting  government military forces  conducting operations to eliminate ISIS presence, all of which occurred in June. ISIS conducts such attacks to demonstrate its continued presence in Syria and acquire resources to sustain its operations.

In recent months, SJAC documenters have observed a trend in which local  media outlets  and  journalists  attribute what appear to be textbook ISIS attacks to “Iranian-affiliated militias,” such as two attacks in Al-Raqqa and Hama governorates in June, which collectively resulted in the killing of a shepherd, the kidnapping of two others, and the slaughter of 80 sheep. Other outlets fail to name a perpetrator when reporting on similar ISIS-style  attacks  targeting government forces in desert areas. Regardless of these outlets’ motivation for attributing the attacks to entities other than ISIS, any attempt to downplay the ongoing impact of ISIS in Syria is a disservice to civilians who continue to be threatened by increasing ISIS activity in both government and SDF-controlled territory.

SJAC’s documentation team also interviewed an individual whom the SDF previously detained in Al-Hasakeh governorate, as a result of his criticism of an Autonomous Administration policy (details intentionally withheld to protect anonymity). He reported being tortured, including with electric shocks, and humiliated in detention.

SJAC documenters note that in addition to those suspected of ISIS affiliation, the SDF frequently arrests people who make any criticism of the Autonomous Administration or the SDF. Even children are subject to such arrests, as evidenced by an Autonomous Administration court ruling in June that  sentenced  a 12-year old boy to three years in prison for “insulting SDF leadership” in a video.  Local media  linked this child’s sentencing to his relation with his uncle, Ahmed Al-Khubail (known as Abu Khawla), who, until recently, served as leader of the Deir Ezzor Military Council. The SDF arrested Abu Khawla and other leaders in August 2023, and the relationship between SDF leadership and the Deir Ezzor Military Council has been strained since then. The child’s sentencing represents an egregious violation on the part of the Autonomous Administration, regardless of the court’s motivation for issuing this ruling.

One of the SDF’s primary objectives in the areas it controls is combating ISIS, which continued to demonstrate its presence via multiple attacks in June. Several attacks in SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ezzor governorate this month killed  SDF members ,  employees  of local AANES institutions, and civilians. Attacks occur regularly in SDF-controlled parts of Al-Hasakeh and Al-Raqqa governorates as well. ISIS activity continues to pose a major threat to civilians in both SDF-controlled and government-controlled territory.

In June, the SDF continued to condone child recruitment in the areas it controls, which is conducted by an affiliated group called the Revolutionary Youth. Media reports and statements to SJAC documenters in June discuss the Revolutionary Youth’s kidnapping of several children (at least 5) this month, including a  14-year old  boy from Kobani, and taking them to youth conscription camps. SJAC has conducted several interviews with families of those kidnapped in similar circumstances, and detailed this pattern of violations more thoroughly in a public  report .

In June 2024, SNA factions reportedly arrested a number of civilians (mainly Kurdish) in  Afrin  and  Azaz . These arrests are not a new phenomenon - they have occurred since Turkey and the SNA factions gained control of the area in 2018, but SJAC has witnessed an increase in these cases in the past few months.

Police  detained  a man in Afrin in early June, less than a week after his return to the area after displacement, on charges of previous “cooperation with the Autonomous Administration.” SNA factions released him after his family paid $1,200 to secure his release. In another incident, police  arrested  7 people from a single village near  Jinderis  on similar charges. In the previous examples and many other cases, the charge of “cooperation with the Autonomous Administration,” refers to actions taken when the area was controlled by the AANES prior to 2018. Accusations of “cooperation” with the AANES could refer to actions such as performing mandatory military service required by the AANES “Self Defense” law, working civilian jobs (teachers, nurses, municipality employees) for the Autonomous Administration, and even something as innocuous as  participating  in a neighborhood watch-style program.

In many cases, including the man released after his arrest in Afrin, the factions offer that the detainee can be released after paying a sum of money, typically thousands of dollars, to members of the Turkish-backed National Army factions who arrested them. According to SJAC’s sources, the arrests serve to intimidate the Kurdish population in northern Aleppo. Members of SNA factions also personally benefit from these detention practices, as they receive payments from detainees’ families in exchange for their relatives’ release. In other cases, such as a Kurdish man who SNA factions  arrested  from a village near  Rajo  in June, families are not offered information about their relatives, and the detained individual’s fate can remain unknown for several weeks or months.

Since the SNA gained control of the area in 2018, SJAC documenters have received regular reports of SNA factions committing housing, land, and property violations against the local population, particularly in Afrin. This month, one man who returned to Afrin after being deported from Turkey shortly before Eid Al-Adha was told that the members of the military police living in his home in Afrin city would only vacate the property if he  paid  them $2,500. In the past few months, SJAC’s documenters have also received multiple reports of original owners attempting to reclaim their land and property, but being severely beaten and/or detained for doing so. For example, two months after a Kurdish man returned to his home near  Maabatli , which a leader of the Asood Al-Sharqiya faction had previously seized, members of the faction  kidnapped  him after he asked for his home to be returned to him.

Competition for seizing civilian property in Afrin and surrounding areas is also a major source of conflict between various factions and opportunistic civilians. This month,  clashes  broke out in Afrin city’s Al-Sina’a neighborhood between members of the Ahrar Al-Sham faction and civilians from outside of Afrin, in a battle for control over several stores in the neighborhood that belong to forcibly displaced Kurdish residents. Clashes involved heavy weapons and resulted in some  civilian  injuries.

Since February 2024, civilians living in HTS-controlled territory, many of whom are displaced from other areas of Syria, have protested HTS actions including its widespread arbitrary detention practices and torture in its detention facilities. In June, protests against HTS continued, calling for Al-Jolani to step down, for political prisoners to be freed, and for reforms to the security services. Throughout the month, protests occurred in Idlib city, Binnish, Armanaz, Deir Hassan, Barisha, Kafr Takharim, the Kafrouma Camp, Hazano, Kafr Lousin, and Al-Atareb.

For the first few months of the protests, HTS/Salvation Government response had been relatively restrained, with Al-Jolani and the Salvation Government making concessions and promises of reform, but protests in May were met with greater security presence, arrests of protest movement leaders/activists, and occasional violent interaction between security forces and protestors.

In June, this increased security presence and attempts to prevent protests continued, along with arrests of activists/organizers, but SJAC documenters did not report instances of violence against protesters this month. Many of the activists detained in June were released within a few days of their arrest. SJAC documenters note that in general, protests against HTS in June yielded a slightly lower turnout than previous months, and noticed a lack of optimism among some of those who are active in organizing the protest movement.

Despite an official ceasefire truce signed in 2020, since late 2023, Syrian government forces and their allies, including Iranian-affiliated militias and Russian aircraft, have ramped up attacks on civilian targets in HTS-controlled areas and areas immediately surrounding it, including southern Idlib, along with parts of Hama and western Aleppo governorates. These attacks often result in civilian casualties. According to SJAC documenters, these attacks aim to demonstrate the Syrian government’s continued presence and intent to regain control of the entirety of Syrian territory. Government forces also attack civilians in HTS-controlled areas as a means of retaliation for attacks that target government soldiers.

In June, Syrian government forces and their allies continued to use various types of artillery, including mortars and rockets, to target civilian areas. In just one of several documented incidents this month, members of Lebanese Hezbollah fired a rocket at a civilian vehicle in  Al-Atareb  (western Aleppo governorate), killing three people who were working on their land. Drone attacks pose another major threat to civilians in this area, and Syrian government forces have increased their use of drones against civilian targets in recent months.

In addition to Russian and Iranian drones used in northwest Syria, government forces use primitive, locally-built first-person view (FPV) suicide drones to attack their targets. These explosive-laden drones, which operate by crashing into their targets, have killed large amounts of civilians in recent months. While a relatively similar amount of drone attacks occurred in June, SJAC documenters reported fewer instances of civilian casualties resulting from drone attacks this month. Documenters noted that in some areas frequently targeted by drones, civilians are taking measures to combat the drones, such as firing shotguns filled with birdshot to take down the drones before they can reach their target, as  described  by a journalist in  Al-Nayrab  village (Idlib governorate).